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NYGAARD, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed:  September 1, 2015) 
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ZANE DAVID MEMEGER 
United States Attorney 
United States Attorney’s Office 
615 Chestnut Street, Suite 1250 
Philadelphia, PA 19106 
 
ROBERT A. ZAUZMER [ARGUED] 
Assistant United States Attorney 
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K.T. NEWTON 
Assistant United States Attorney 
          Counsel for Appellant 
 
MATTHEW STIEGLER, Esq.   [ARGUED] 
Post Office Box 18861 
Philadelphia, PA 19119 
          Counsel for Appellee 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
 The Government appeals the District Court’s grant of 
Regina Tolliver’s (“Appellee” or “Tolliver”) 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255 motion.  Because material facts are in dispute 
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surrounding Tolliver’s ineffective assistance of counsel 
(“IAC”) allegations based on her trial counsel’s failure to 
investigate, the District Court abused its discretion in granting 
the § 2255 motion without first holding an evidentiary 
hearing.  As such, we will vacate and remand, so that a 
hearing may be held. 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 Between March and November 2007 fraudulent checks 
in the amount of $181,577 were cashed against the accounts 
of seven Citizens Bank customers in branches in upstate New 
York, western Pennsylvania, and Delaware.  Citizens Bank 
senior fraud investigator Todd Swoyer ran a report for each of 
the compromised accounts and discovered that Tolliver’s 
employee number was the only one used to access all seven 
of the customer accounts; the accounts were accessed on 
February 5 and 8, 2007, and on March 7, 8, and 9, 2007.  
Employee attendance records confirmed that only Tolliver 
and branch assistant manager Angela Anderson worked on all 
of these days.  Tolliver’s logbook did not indicate that she 
was assigned to contact any of these account holders for sales 
purposes on those dates or that she did, in fact, contact them.  
 Swoyer, United States Postal Inspector Frank Busch, 
and a Secret Service agent interviewed Tolliver on March 15, 
2007.  At trial, Swoyer testified that he reviewed Tolliver’s 
entire logbook with her during her interview and that the only 
passwords in her logbook were for HR Express, a system 
unrelated to the systems used to access customer data.  
Further, he testified that Tolliver told him that she had not 
given her password to anyone and that she always logged off 
her computer when she walked away from a terminal.  All 
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seven of Tolliver’s former co-workers who testified said they 
never knew Tolliver’s password or saw it written down. 
 A jury convicted Tolliver of bank fraud in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 1344, aggravated identity theft in violation of 18 
U.S.C. §§ 1028A(a)(1), (c)(5), and 2, and unauthorized use of 
a computer in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030.  The District 
Court denied a motion for acquittal or new trial.  At the 
sentencing hearing, the District Court imposed a below-
Guidelines sentence of 30 months’ imprisonment, a five-year 
term of supervised release, and ordered Tolliver to pay 
$181,577 in restitution and a special assessment of $900.  We 
affirmed on direct appeal, 451 F. App’x 97 (3d Cir. 2011), 
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 105 (2012). 
 In September 2013, Tolliver, represented by newly 
appointed counsel, filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion and on 
March 10, 2014, filed an amended motion.  Tolliver claimed 
that her trial counsel was ineffective for various reasons, 
including his failure to investigate her case.1  She asserted 
that subsequent investigations undertaken by her new counsel 
and by her private investigator, Diane Cowan, had uncovered 
evidence that established that she was prejudiced by her trial 
                                              
 1 Tolliver also alleged IAC based on her trial 
counsel’s:  1) failure to cross-examine prosecution witnesses 
adequately; 2) failure to prepare the character witnesses; 3) 
instruction that Tolliver not testify; 4) failure to object to 
prosecutorial misconduct; and 5) failure to prepare a 
sentencing memorandum.  Because the District Court did not 
address these claims, we will not consider them here. 
 
5 
 
counsel’s ineffectiveness.  Tolliver presented this evidence as 
exhibits to her § 2255 motion, including:  1) documents 
reflecting that two of her Citizens Bank co-workers had 
financial difficulties and 2) affidavits asserting that additional 
co-conspirators, including the “ringleader” Miguel Bell and 
his “right hand man” Christopher Russell, denied knowing 
Tolliver.  Tolliver also asserted that her co-workers Angela 
Anderson and Linda Carter knew Tolliver’s password.  
Tolliver sought release or a new trial; or, in the alternative, an 
evidentiary hearing. 
 Magistrate Judge Jacob P. Hart issued his Report and 
Recommendation “recommend[ing] that the motion be denied 
without an evidentiary hearing,” and concluding that the 
“motion, files and records show conclusively that the prisoner 
is entitled to no relief.”  Id. at 771.  The District Court did not 
adopt the Report and Recommendation and instead granted 
the § 2255 motion without holding a hearing and ordered a 
new trial.  Specifically, the District Court stated:  
The verdict against Tolliver, which relied 
solely on the use of her employee identification 
number, was only weakly supported by the 
record.  On these facts, it was not appropriate 
to decline to find prejudice simply because the 
information which trial counsel failed to 
discover was something less than a smoking 
gun. 
United States v. Tolliver, No. 08-026, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
96232, at *8 (E.D. Pa. July 15, 2014).  In reaching this 
conclusion, the District Court found “that several of 
Tolliver’s co-workers, particularly Anderson, had pressing 
financial needs” and stated that “although counsel argued to 
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the jury that the prosecution lacked evidence that the other 
participants in the fraud knew Tolliver, he was not able to 
argue affirmatively that they denied knowing her, because he 
did not interview any of them.”  Id. at *8–9.  The District 
Court did not comment on Tolliver’s assertion that Anderson 
knew her password or the fact that this assertion directly 
contradicted a prior statement by Tolliver and the testimony 
of all of her co-workers. 
 Tolliver was ordered released on bail on July 17, 2014, 
and a new jury trial was set for October 6, 2014.  The 
Government filed this appeal on September 15, 2014. 
III. ANALYSIS 
 The District Court had jurisdiction to consider 
Tolliver’s 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion pursuant to that statute.  
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  See 
United States v. Allen, 613 F.2d 1248, 1250 (3d Cir. 1980) 
(holding that “the grant of a new trial is a final, appealable 
order in proceedings under § 2255”).  “[T]he district court 
abuses its discretion if it fails to hold an evidentiary hearing 
when the files and records of the case are inconclusive as to 
whether the movant is entitled to relief.”  United States v. 
Booth, 432 F.3d 542, 546 (3d Cir. 2005).  “It is irrelevant 
whether the Government or [movant] requested the hearing 
because § 2255 requires the District Court to hold a hearing 
sua sponte when, as here, the files and records do not show 
conclusively that [the movant] was not entitled to relief.”  
Solis v. United States, 252 F.3d 289, 294 (3d Cir. 2001). 
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 A. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Legal Standards 
 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b) states:  “Unless the motion and 
the files and records of the case conclusively show that the 
prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall cause notice 
thereof to be served upon the United States attorney, grant a 
prompt hearing thereon, determine the issues and make 
findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto.”  
We have interpreted this to mean that where a “‘petition 
allege[s] any facts warranting relief under § 2255 that are not 
clearly resolved by the record, the District Court [is] 
obligated to follow the statutory mandate to hold an 
evidentiary hearing.’”  Booth, 432 F.3d at 546 (quoting 
United States v. McCoy, 410 F.3d 124, 134 (3d Cir. 2005)). 
 Though the germane precedents all involve cases 
wherein a district court denied a § 2255 motion without first 
holding an evidentiary hearing, they apply with equal force 
here — where the District Court granted Tolliver’s § 2255 
without first holding a hearing.  The same standard applies so 
that a district court abuses its discretion if, in the face of 
disputes of material fact, it grants or denies a § 2255 motion 
without first holding an evidentiary hearing. 
 A district court considering a § 2255 motion “‘must 
accept the truth of the movant’s factual allegations unless 
they are clearly frivolous on the basis of the existing record.’”  
Id. at 545 (quoting Gov’t of V.I. v. Forte, 865 F.2d 59, 62 (3d 
Cir. 1989)).  In the IAC context, a movant need only “raise[] 
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sufficient allegations” that his counsel was ineffective in 
order to warrant a hearing.2  Id. at 549.   
                                              
 2 The familiar Strickland standard governs whether a 
§ 2255 movant has established an IAC claim.  Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  The first prong 
requires the movant to show “that counsel made errors so 
serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ 
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.”  Id.  To 
establish Strickland’s second prong, the movant must “show[] 
that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the 
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.”  Id.  
This equates to “a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings 
would have been different.  A reasonable probability is a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome.”  Id. at 694.  The Government does not appear to 
dispute that the first Strickland prong is met.  Tolliver’s trial 
counsel signed an affidavit stating that he failed to perform 
any investigation and relied solely on records turned over by 
the prosecution.  App. at 577 (“They could not afford to hire a 
private investigator. . . .”).  Tolliver’s trial counsel also 
admitted that he did not interview any witnesses.  Id. (“I do 
not interview witnesses myself to keep from becoming a 
witness in my own case, so I was not able to interview any 
witnesses before trial.”).  “‘[F]ailure to investigate a critical 
source of potentially exculpatory evidence may present a case 
of constitutionally defective representation.’”  United States 
v. Travillion, 759 F.3d 281, 293 n.23 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting 
United States v. Baynes, 622 F.2d 66, 69 (3d Cir. 1980)). 
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 B. Disputed Material Facts 
 The following evidence, put forth by Tolliver in her 
§ 2255 motion, creates disputes of material fact such that a 
hearing is necessary before the District Court can address 
Tolliver’s underlying claim that her trial counsel was 
constitutionally ineffective. 
  1. Co-Workers’ Financial Troubles 
 Tolliver presented evidence that her co-workers 
Angela Anderson and Linda Carter experienced financial 
difficulties and asserted that their troubles occurred around 
the time of the fraud.  For instance, exhibits attached to 
Tolliver’s § 2255 motion show that a foreclosure suit was 
initiated against Anderson on March 6, 2006 and discontinued 
on April 3, 2006.  The exhibits also show that Discover Bank 
initiated a suit against Anderson on August 23, 2005 alleging 
that Anderson owed a balance of $5,944.65; this suit was 
discontinued on January 12, 2007.  Other exhibits attached to 
Tolliver’s amended § 2255 motion show that Carter was sued 
by a school district for unpaid school taxes in the amount of 
$6,164.54.  The school district suit against Carter was filed on 
June 28, 2007, and she satisfied her debt by February 29, 
2008.  Tolliver argues that this evidence establishes that her 
co-workers had a stronger motive than she to commit the 
Citizens Bank fraud. 
  2. Not Known by Co-Conspirators 
 Tolliver appended affidavits to her § 2255 motion 
from co-conspirators Miguel Bell and Christopher Russell 
asserting that they do not know her.  Tolliver also submitted 
affidavits from Cowan (her private investigator), which state 
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that five identified co-conspirators allegedly informed Cowan 
that they did not know Tolliver (Rashin Owens, Victor 
O’Connor, Elton Harris, Michael Merin, and Tiffany Brodie), 
however these individuals either refused or failed to complete 
an affidavit to that effect.3 
 Tolliver argues that this evidence establishes that she 
could not have taken part in the Citizens Bank fraud.  
However, as the Government argues in its Reply Brief, no 
one has asserted or established that each of the middle men 
involved in this fraud was apprehended.  Reply Br. at 9.  
Additionally, nothing in the Bell and Russell affidavits 
suggests that they necessarily would have known Tolliver if 
she had been involved in the fraud. 
  3. An Evidentiary Hearing Is Required 
 Based on Tolliver’s newly presented evidence, the 
District Court concluded:  1) that “a reasonable probability 
clearly exists that, if the jury knew that several of Tolliver’s 
co-workers, particularly Anderson, had pressing financial 
needs which Tolliver lacked, it could have changed the 
                                              
 3 To satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland the 
movant “must establish a reasonable probability — one 
sufficient to undermine our confidence in the outcome — that 
the jury’s verdict would have been different if not for 
counsel’s errors.  Such a showing may not be based on mere 
speculation about what the witnesses [the attorney] failed to 
locate might have said.”  United States v. Gray, 878 F.2d 702, 
712 (3d Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted). 
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outcome at trial”; and 2) that “it is now clear that not even 
those identified as ‘insiders’ knew [Tolliver],” a fact that, had 
it been known by trial counsel, “would have meaningfully 
strengthened his defense.”  Tolliver, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
96232, at *8–9.   
 The problem with these conclusions is that the District 
Court failed to follow the procedure put forth in 
§ 2255:  where there are disputes of material fact, the first 
step is to hold an evidentiary hearing.  Only then, after 
Tolliver’s factual assertions have been tested, is the District 
Court in the position to assess the merits of her underlying 
IAC claim and to grant or deny her § 2255 motion.  It was an 
abuse of discretion for the District Court not to hold a hearing 
to resolve these disputes before granting Tolliver’s § 2255 
motion.4  Booth, 432 F.3d at 546. 
                                              
 4 The District Court did not specifically address 
Tolliver’s contention that her password was not, in fact, 
secure and was known by her co-workers, including 
Anderson.  However, at trial, the Government presented 
evidence that, when interviewed by Swoyer and Busch, 
Tolliver stated that she complied with Bank policy by not 
writing down her password and keeping it secret from her co-
workers.  Tolliver specifically told Swoyer and Busch that 
she kept a list of her passwords for other programs (e.g., the 
HR system), but, in keeping with the Bank’s policy, did not 
write down her password for accessing customer data.  
Additionally, as the District Court noted when it denied 
Tolliver’s post-trial motion for acquittal, “all of Defendant’s 
former co-workers who testified at trial stated that they did 
not know Defendant’s password.”  App. at 52.  This is an 
additional disputed material fact that must be addressed at an 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons we will vacate and remand 
with instructions that the District Court hold an evidentiary 
hearing to resolve the disputes of material fact. 
                                                                                                     
evidentiary hearing.  The materiality of whether Tolliver’s 
password was secret is underscored by Swoyer’s testimony 
on cross-examination that he was not aware of a single bank 
fraud conspiracy where an employee’s password was 
compromised and used by a co-worker to commit a fraud. 
 
